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Abstract
Although capital inflows are generally beneficial to recipient countries, they also pose 
significant challenges to the conduct of economic policy. This paper proposes a conceptual 
taxonomy to guide the design of policy responses in the face of capital flows. We explore 
how responses to capital surges should be differentiated based on the source of balance of 
payments pressures, and empirically examine whether policy reactions of countries conform 
to this taxonomy while underscoring the importance of country-specific factors, such as 
balance sheet effects and cyclical positions. For the most part, we find correspondence 
between the proposed taxonomy and observed policy choices, especially in more recent 
years.
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1I.   INTRODUCTION
1.     While capital inflows are beneficial to recipient countries, they can impose significant 
challenges for the conduct of economic policy. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the high 
investment-high growth that follows a surge in capital inflows—through their effect at 
reducing interest rates and relaxing financing constraints—to be accompanied by 
deteriorations in the external accounts and upward pressures on goods and assets prices. This 
overheating strains the balance between the benefits of inflows in terms of higher investment 
and growth and the risks they imply for macroeconomic stability. Moreover, even when a 
country’s policy response is sound, capital inflows might increase the vulnerability to a 
sudden change in market sentiment and the reversal of capital flows. Further complicating 
matters, policymakers need to stay abreast with competing policy objectives and financial 
innovations that affect the effectiveness of the policy toolkit at their disposal.
2.     Such challenges are of particular importance during periods of growing global liquidity
—as the one experienced from early 2003 until mid-2007.
1 The period preceding the recent 
financial instability was characterized not only by abundant global liquidity, but also by the 
emergence of current account surpluses that have resulted in positive balance of payments 
pressures in many (though clearly not all) emerging market economies (EMEs). 
3.     Indeed, recognizing the importance of policy responses to capital flows, the 
International Monetary and Finance Committee has called for work on the Fund's policy 
advice to emerging market economies in the design of policy responses in the face of large 
1 Periods of high global liquidity are identified based on the indicators discussed in the World Economic 
Outlook (April 2007).
2capital inflows (IMFC Communiqué, October 2007). The IMF’s Executive Board has also 
called for additional research to provide guidance on policy choices.
2
4.     Among recent studies of capital flows, the October 2007 WEO examines the 
macroeconomic impacts of different policy measures based on a large sample of developing, 
emerging markets, and advanced economies during surges in capital flows. It concludes that 
allowing the nominal exchange rate to appreciate and exercising fiscal restraints during 
periods of large inflows can help limit real currency appreciation and foster better growth 
outcomes in the aftermath of such episodes. Likewise, the October 2007 GFSR looked at the 
relationship between capital flows, market depth, and liquidity. 
5.     This paper builds on the insights of the recent WEO and GFSR chapters to consider how 
the specific circumstances facing the country help refine the general policy prescriptions. A 
first question is of course whether the capital inflows or balance of payments (BOP) 
pressures (i.e., a tendency for the nominal exchange rate to appreciate or reserves to 
accumulate) indeed present a policy problem. This, in turn, depends upon a number of 
factors of which two are worth noting. First, is the country’s external indebtedness or net 
foreign asset position evolving sustainably and is the financial system in sound condition? 
For instance, for many capital-poor developing and emerging market countries, it may be 
desirable to receive capital inflows as long as debt sustainability and financial soundness are 
maintained; conversely, a country may wish to build up savings abroad because its 
population is aging or because its exports are based on nonrenewable resources. Second, 
what is the cyclical position of the economy and, in particular, are there inflationary 
pressures amidst a growing risk of asset price bubbles? 
2 The Chair’s Concluding Remarks on “Globalization, Financial Markets, and Fiscal Policy” (BUFF/08/23).
36.     These are not, however, the only factors to take into account in designing policy 
responses. For instance, the nature of capital flows—official versus private; FDI versus 
portfolio flows; fixed income versus equity—and their duration—persistent or temporary 
(e.g., they might correspond to a privatization program of state-owned assets)—are also key 
aspects of assessing the appropriate policy response to capital flows. In addition, the 
structure of domestic balance sheets—e.g., are currency or maturity mismatches being 
exacerbated by capital flows and what is the adequacy of a country’s foreign exchange 
reserves—are also pertinent to tailoring policy responses appropriately. This is also the case 
for other institutional factors, such as financial market depth and the exchange rate regime.
7.     Against this background, this paper proposes a conceptual taxonomy that can guide 
policy responses, while recognizing that specific recommendations must take account of 
country-specific factors. It bears emphasizing that the taxonomy helps nuance the general 
policy recommendation—not overturn them. Thus, ultimately, in the face of sustained 
positive balance of payments pressures, countries may have to allow nominal and real 
exchange rate appreciation. Likewise, they would be well advised to tighten fiscal policies 
and reduce public debt during these periods of high capital inflows if only to have the scope 
for fiscal expansion during outflows. Nevertheless, the extent and urgency with which to 
implement these general recommendations may depend on the country’s position in the 
taxonomy. Against this background, the paper attempts to answer three questions:
 How should the policy response to capital surges be differentiated based on the BOP 
pressure position as well as the source of these pressures?
 Do countries respond to inflows as the taxonomy would suggest, controlling for 
differences in balance sheets, cyclical positions, and institutional factors?
4 Finally, how do macroeconomic outcomes—as measured by the real exchange rate—
relate to the policy responses described by the taxonomy?
8.     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some stylized 
facts on recent capital flows to EMEs. Section III presents a conceptual taxonomy based on 
the differences in the nature and source of BOP pressures and discusses the appropriate 
policy responses for each category. Section IV first examines whether observed policy 
responses are consistent with the taxonomy’s predictions after controlling for country-
specific factors. It then examines how these policy responses are related to the 
macroeconomic outcomes in these countries. Section V concludes.
II.   RECENT CAPITAL FLOWS IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES—STYLIZED FACTS
9.     Over the past couple of decades, capital flows to emerging markets have followed 
several cycles, with a generally rising trend until end-2007 (Figure 1).
3 As discussed in the 
October 2007 WEO chapter, there have been two episodes of large inflows in the past couple 
of decades. The first began in the early 1990s and peaked prior to the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis. The second episode has been building up since 2002; e.g., during 2004–06, 
annual net capital inflows to emerging economies averaged more than 4 percent of GDP. 
3 The discussion is based on simple averages for a sample of 50 emerging market countries; see Appendix I 
for the list of market access EMEs used in this paper. 
5Figure 1. Selected Emerging Market Countries: Balance of Payments Developments
Sources:  International Monetary Fund; WEO  database, and IMF staff estimates
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10.     The recent surge of capital to EMEs that begun in late 2002 differs from previous ones 
in at least three respects. First, in many countries, they are occurring against a backdrop of 
current account surpluses. Second, private capital is playing a more dominant role. Third, 
FDI accounts for a greater share of total flows. More generally, the macroeconomic situation 
in most recipient EMEs is stronger—public sector deficits are smaller, exchange rate regimes 
are more flexible, inflation is lower, and foreign exchange reserves are larger (Figure 2).
4 
11.     Regional differences are also noticeable, with the largest increases in reserves being in 
the Middle East (8 percent of GDP), followed by Asia (4 percent of GDP), Central and 
South America (2 percent of GDP) and Europe (1 percent of GDP). The real exchange rate 
4 See World Economic Outlook (October 2007) for more details.
6appreciation has been the smallest in the Middle East (almost zero),
5 followed by Asia and 
the Central and South American countries (7 percent), and Europe (12 percent). Moreover, 
while all regions experienced real exchange rate appreciations, in Asia, the Middle East, and 
Central and South American countries this took the form of higher inflation against a 
depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (1–3 percent per year). In Europe, by 
contrast, reserve accumulation has been slow, nominal exchange rates have appreciated and, 
correspondingly, inflation differentials have been small.
12.     Breaking down the sample of EMEs by region also suggests differences in terms of the 
characteristics of capital flows (of course, these averages still mask important differences 
across countries). In Asia, the 1997–98 financial crisis marked a sharp turning point from the 
current account: from deficits of about 3 percent of GDP to surpluses of the same magnitude 
(Figure 3). With the exception of FDI, private capital flows have been negative, as have 
official flows with the repayment of official financing provided during the crisis. European 
countries, by contrast, have large and growing current account deficits. These deficits were 
financed by FDI until 2001; since then, non-FDI flows have grown in importance and now 
account for about one-half of the total external financing. In the Western Hemisphere and 
Middle Eastern countries, current account balances have improved—though, on average, 
they remain in deficit—and most capital inflows have taken the form of FDI. 
5 It is worth noting that the sample of Middle East countries excludes most oil producers; see Appendix I.
7Figure 2. Macroeconomic Developments, 1990–2007
Figure 2. Macroeconomic Developments, 1990–2007
Source: International Monetary Fund; WEO database, AREAER, and IMF staff estimates.
1/  A 1 represents a fixed exchange rate and an 8 is a freely floating regime; AREAER classification.
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13.     The consequence of this surge of capital flows is positive balance of payments 
pressures on the economy. On average, CPI-based real exchange rates have appreciated by 
4 percent over the period 2002–06, and reserves have increased from about 18 percent of 
GDP at end-2002 to 21½ percent of GDP by end-2006. While economic activity has 
8remained above potential in many EMEs, inflationary pressures were subdued for much of 
the decade, though this has gradually changed owing to the pick up in commodity prices.
Figure 3. Regional Capital Flows in Emerging Market Countries (In percent of GDP)
Sources:  International Monetary Fund;  WEO  database, and IMF  staff estimates
1/ Turkey only  until  1994. Includes  transition economies from 1995  onwards.
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III.   CAPITAL FLOWS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PRESSURES—A TAXONOMY
14.     The above discussion suggests some important differences in the nature and source of 
balance of payments pressures. This section presents a simple conceptual taxonomy to 
9highlight these differences and their implications for a country’s policy response. Before 
doing so, however, it bears emphasizing that the appropriate policy response should also 
depend on factors not explicitly included in the taxonomy. Indeed, country experiences 
should not necessarily be thought of belonging definitively to one category versus another; 
rather, it is a matter of the degree that depends on country-specific factors such as balance 
sheet variables, cyclical position, and financial and institutional characteristics.
15.     The analysis begins by noting that, while many EMEs face positive BOP pressures, the 
appropriate policy response depends on the source of these pressures. To develop a taxonomy 
of cases, it is useful to consider a two-dimensional representation of net capital flows 
(vertical axis)—where capital flows excludes transactions in reserves—and current account 
balances (horizontal axis), which can be segmented into five cases:
 Case 1. Capital Inflows Responding to Current Account Financing Needs 
(Quadrant II below the 45 degree line). Capital flows are helping to finance the 
country’s current account deficit. Although the net BOP pressure (defined as net total 
capital flows plus the current account balance) is negative, the dependency on capital 
flows might raise concerns about debt sustainability and the country’s exposure to the 
risk of sudden stops (particularly if these are non-FDI flows). The premise is that capital 
flows are responding to the country’s demand for external savings. Thus, if there are 
concerns about capital inflows, economic policies should a priori be geared to reducing 
the current account imbalance and cooling the economy.
 Case 2. Capital Inflows in Search of Yield (Quadrant I and II above the respective 
45 degree lines). In contrast to Case 1, here the “tail wags the dog”—rather than 
10responding to the country’s current account financing needs, net total capital flows are 
assumed to be determined mainly by supply-side factors (namely, abundant liquidity in 
search of yield). If the country has a current account deficit, then net total capital flows 
would substantially exceed this deficit. In contrast, if the current account is in surplus, it 
would still be the case that the BOP pressures are dominated by the magnitude of total 
capital inflows. Either way, such inflows are complicating macroeconomic management 
and policies would need to be geared toward selectively reducing these capital inflows 
and even encouraging outflows.
 Case 3. BOP Pressures from Current Account Surplus (Quadrant I below 45 degree 
line and Quadrant IV with positive BOP pressures). In this case, capital inflows are 
assumed to be less important than the registered current account surpluses; in fact, these 
surpluses could be accompanied by small capital outflows and still represent positive 
BOP pressures. If the current account surplus is considered excessive (for instance, in 
terms of the evolution of the country’s NFA position), then policies should seek to 
narrow it. By contrast, if the current account surplus is considered appropriate (for 
instance, from an intertemporal perspective), then policies to encourage capital outflows 
(e.g., liberalizing controls on outflows) might be useful. 
 Case 4. Current Account Surplus Offset by Outflows (Quadrant IV below 45 degree 
line). Outflows offset the current account surplus—negative BOP pressures.
 Case 5. Pre-Crisis and Crisis Region (Quadrant III). Reflects the large capital 
outflows and current account imbalances that could reflect a capital account crisis.
11Figure 4. Taxonomy based on Total Capital Flows and Current Account Balances
(In percent of GDP; annual data 1989–2007)
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16.     The above flows-based conceptual taxonomy provides definitions of different 
circumstances under which a country might be facing capital inflows (or outflows) and/or 
balance of payments pressures. Whether—or to what extent—a country fits into any single 
case will be a matter of judgment that depends on a country’s own circumstances, including 
the balance sheet and cyclical position of the economy. In fact, capital flows in a Case 2 
country are not only financing and responding to the country’s current account deficit but 
also helping to fuel that deficit by causing a consumption boom and overheating the 
economy (as happened in East Asia prior to the 1997–98 crisis); thus, the country could be 
considered to be closer to a Case 1 and the policy response would change accordingly. In 
12sum, the classification in Figure 4 is an illustration of how countries’ circumstances can be 
mapped to the taxonomy based on total capital flows and current account balances. 
17.     Despite its simplicity (and limitations), a classification based on flows alone is quite 
revealing. For instance, according to Figure 4, Lebanon and Slovakia would be classified as 
Case 1 countries in 2006 (capital inflows responding to financing needs)—if the volume of 
capital inflows is of concern because of rising vulnerabilities, then the priority should be to 
tackle the current account deficits. By contrast, some East Asian countries—such as China—
are Case 3 countries in 2006: current account surplus-driven BOP pressures. Latin 
American countries like Uruguay would be classified as Case 2 (inflows in search of  yield) 
during 2006, but others (Argentina, not shown) would be classified as Case 3. Overall, the 
classification according to capital flows and current account balances can be refined to 
estimate the degree to which a country in any given year should be categorized as one case 
or another by using the distance from the central definition of each case—more precisely, 
how far an observation might be from a neighboring case. For example, Venezuela is 
probably a combination of Case 3 and Case 4. (Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each 
case.)
13Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, 1989–2007 (In percent of GDP)
1989-2007 1999-2007
Current Total BOP Current Total BOP
account capital pressures account capital pressures
balance flows balance flows
Case 1 Case 1
Number of observations 181 181 181 81 81 81
Mean -6.8 3.9 -2.9 -5.5 3.8 -1.8
Standard deviation 7.5 4.1 6.4 4.0 3.1 2.2
Case 2 Case 2
Number of observations 447 447 447 223 223 223
Mean -3.7 7.0 3.3 -4.1 7.7 3.5
Standard deviation 4.3 5.7 3.6 5.3 6.1 3.2
Case 3 Case 3
Number of observations 158 158 158 112 112 112
Mean 6.3 -1.8 4.5 7.0 -2.1 4.9
Standard deviation 5.3 4.2 3.4 5.7 4.6 3.5
Case 4 Case 4
Number of observations 38 38 38 20 20 20
Mean 3.6 -5.8 -2.1 5.1 -7.3 -2.2
Standard deviation 3.2 4.2 2.8 3.5 5.0 3.3
Case 5 Case 5
Number of observations 36 36 36 14 14 14
Mean -3.1 -1.7 -4.8 -1.6 -1.8 -3.3
Standard deviation 3.4 1.4 3.4 1.5 1.7 1.7
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook and staff calculations.
18.     Before getting into the details of each policy response, however, two caveats should be 
noted. First, although each policy option is discussed separately, the policy response to 
capital flows should really be considered as a package of measures, including the mix of 
various policy instruments and the structure of inflows. Second, the discussion of policy 
responses below is based on an analysis of flows and, thus, as previously noted, it does not 
account for how the policy options might be affected by other factors, such as balance sheet 
positions, state of financial markets and the evolving nature of financial instruments, and a 
host of other macroeconomic variables (including a country’s existing policies and cyclical 
position). 
14A.   Combinations of Policy Responses
19.     Figure 5 summarizes the available policy choices for each case, subject of course to 
the caveats previously discussed (Case 5, which relates to pre-crisis and crisis episodes, is 
not discussed). It should be noted that the exposition does not discuss what could be 
characterized as unorthodox policy responses; e.g., the possible role of specific tax policies 
not only in tightening fiscal policy, but also in terms of their effect on resource allocation.
6 
Exchange Rate Flexibility
20.     Faced by positive balance of payments pressures, the first decision is whether to 
accumulate foreign exchange reserves, thereby resisting a nominal (and perhaps real) 
exchange rate appreciation, or to allow the exchange rate to absorb the BOP pressures. 
Although the prospect of an appreciation is likely to encourage further capital inflows, a 
sufficiently large appreciation will make investment more expensive, lowering the yield and 
the attractiveness of the investment. An appreciation, however, could be damaging to 
exports. 
6 The less traditional (or unorthodox) policy responses refer, primarily, to tax policy measures; these are not 
formally part of the taxonomy in this paper (Heller, 1997). The orthodox response is to tighten fiscal policy 
when there are large capital inflows to prevent the economy from overheating, but this is less helpful in 
lowering the volatility of capital flows or affecting the composition of these flows. Some tax measures have 
been proposed that could be useful to reduce the volatility. There may be other somewhat unorthodox tax 
measures for consideration that could target certain types of capital flows—as opposed to targeting all capital 
inflows—and that could have negative externalities (for example, real estate investment). The merits of such 
specific tax measures are two-fold: targeting overheating in a specific economic activity and reducing broader 
speculative activity and volatility. The demerits, however, are also two-fold: they might lead to distortions in 
resource allocation, and they act as the equivalent of capital controls, with the usual attendant costs.
15Figure 5. Policy Responses—Flow Approach
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21.     In this context, allowing the nominal exchange rate to appreciate would therefore be 
most appropriate for countries with positive current account balances, such is the case in 
Case 3.
7 Conversely, in Case 1, an exchange rate appreciation would worsen the current 
account balance and, inasmuch as capital flows are responding to the current account deficit, 
result in greater inflows. Case 2 is more ambiguous since it encompasses both current 
account surpluses and deficits—and, in contrast to Case 3, the BOP pressures are assumed 
not to come from the current account surplus; as such, there may be greater reluctance to 
allow exchange rate appreciation. On the other hand, since capital flows in Case 2 are 
assumed to be responding to supply-side factors, they may be especially sensitive to the 
7 In Case 3 countries, if exports are mainly of nonrenewable resources and there are hysteresis effects of an 
appreciation on nontraditional exports, then it is likely that the authorities might seek to limit appreciation.
16prospect of an exchange rate appreciation. Thus, once such expectations are entrenched, 
allowing the exchange rate to appreciate may be unavoidable.
22.     Comparing the various cases, therefore, countries in Case 3 should—ceteris paribus—
allow greater nominal exchange rate appreciation (rather than reserves accumulation) than 
countries in Case 1 and Case 2; Case 4 would limit appreciation. To what extent should they 
do so? The decision to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate will depend on a 
variety of other factors, including the exchange rate regime, the level of central bank’s 
reserves and its ability to sterilize the monetary impact of reserve accumulation, the cyclical 
position of the economy, and the response to other policy instruments. The combination of 
these factors are examined in the empirical section.
Monetary and Sterilization Policy
23.     Given the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, a further decision is whether or 
not to sterilize its monetary impact. Central banks sometimes try to offset BOP pressures 
through sterilized intervention, although most studies find that such intervention has little 
impact on the nominal exchange rate, let alone the real exchange rate. In terms of the 
conceptual taxonomy, sterilizing foreign exchange purchases may be particularly unsuitable 
for countries in Case 2 because, in this case, capital flows are assumed to be driven mainly 
by supply-side factors, including a search for yield. In fact, sterilization of capital inflows, 
by perpetuating higher interest rates, is likely to foster continued capital inflows. 
24.     More generally, how should monetary policy respond in each case to BOP pressures? 
To be sure, inflationary factors and the cyclical position of the economy would be at the fore 
of any central banks’ policy reaction function. That aside, in Case 1, tightening may be 
17required as this will dampen economic activity, narrow the current account deficit and hence 
capital flows. In Case 2, by contrast, monetary policy is more likely to be loosened since a 
tighter stance—by raising interest rates—is likely to attract even larger capital inflows. 
Monetary policy should also be loosened in Case 3 and Case 4—to reduce the current 
account surplus by stimulating activity and to encourage capital outflows by lowering 
interest rates—both of which should help relieve the BOP pressures; this also depends on 
inflationary expectations that have been low in recent years but that have recently picked up. 
Of course, non-flow country-specific characteristics also need to be taken into account. For 
instance, a country with large current account deficits financed by large inflows might have 
accumulated liabilities to a degree that warrant a classification nuanced by its Case 1 
features. Also, as noted previously, the policy response needs to account for inflationary 
expectations.
Fiscal Policy
25.     Another major policy instrument for dealing with balance of payments pressures is 
fiscal policy. The taxonomy suggests that countries in Case 1 should tighten fiscal policy to 
help correct the current account deficit (and, thus, the need for external financing) followed 
by Case 2 countries (where fiscal tightening would lower interest rates, reducing capital 
inflows—unless perceptions of a more “prudent” fiscal policy leads to a larger decline in the 
risk premium demanded by investors).
8 Case 3 countries would have the least need to tighten 
(and could even loosen) fiscal policy, followed by Case 4 (where part of the current account 
8 Schadler et al. (1993) argue that fiscal consolidation was an important factor attracting capital flows to 
developing and emerging market countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
18surplus is already offset by net capital outflows). In practice, however, few countries in the 
end implement such fiscal policy restraint when global liquidity is high.
9 
Prudential Measures and Controls
26.     A discussion of policy responses would clearly be incomplete without a discussion of 
prudential measures and controls. While prudential measures seek to regulate risk taking by 
financial institutions and are typically intended to improve the long-term soundness of the 
banking system, in some cases they take the form of controls that restrict international capital 
movements by discriminating between international and domestic capital transactions.
10 To 
achieve success with prudential rules, the authorities should have the capacity not only to set 
the rules but also to enforce them. As financial innovations take hold in EMEs, greater 
monitoring of these innovations and capital surges are required by supervisors and 
regulators. 
27.     Could controls on inflows (or removing controls on outflows) be useful? For Case 1 
countries, neither imposing controls on inflows nor removing controls on outflows makes 
much sense without first tackling the current account deficit.
11 For Case 3 and Case 4, the 
balance of payments pressures do not come from net capital inflows, but removing or 
relaxing controls on capital outflows could help relieve some of the balance of payments 
9 A recent World Economic Outlook chapter on capital inflows (October 2007) shows that fiscal restraint 
works well as a policy response to large inflows. Schadler et al. (1993) show that while fiscal restraint was 
advisable to prevent overheating and appreciation, but only one country (Thailand) out of the six in their 
study did so.
10 Prudential frameworks typically prescribe minimum standards, both quantitative and qualitative, covering 
capital adequacy, asset concentration, risk management, liquidity and internal controls, and take the form of 
laws, regulations, and officially sanctioned policies or procedures designed to protect the financial system. 
11 In some cases, the capital inflow is fueling the current account deficit—making the country more of a 
“blend” between Cases 1 and 2 in the taxonomy above—in which case, reducing the availability of foreign 
savings (by imposing controls) or tightening prudential regulations on bank lending (if this is the source of 
external finance) could play a useful role. 
19pressures. It is thus for Case 2 countries that imposing controls on inflows could be useful—
although experience to date suggests their effectiveness is limited and their administrative 
and economic costs potentially large. Two of the countries that have experimented in recent 
years with controls on capital inflows; Thailand (Case 2) and Colombia (Case 1) are worth 
mentioning, though there are several other countries in the same category who have not 
imposed capital controls. Also, whether controls would be appropriate depends, inter alia, on 
the vulnerability of domestic balance sheets due to existing maturity and currency 
mismatches, the nature of the capital flows, and the scope for monetary and fiscal policy 
responses—as well as the exact form of the proposed capital control. 
B.   Illustrations of More Complex Policy Decision Trees
28.     The policy discussion thus far has focused only on the flow characteristics of the 
economy, even though in reality an array of other factors (from balance sheet variables to 
other macroeconomic, financial, and institutional factors) could also play a role in choosing 
policy responses. In fact, the taxonomy is purposely kept simple because a more complex 
policy decision tree rapidly becomes intractable. For instance, Figure 6 (Panel A) depicts the 
BOP pressures data for Case 1 and Case 2 together with short-term debt-to-reserves ratios 
(larger bubbles represent larger ratios). These charts show that Case 1 countries had low 
liquidity in 1997 (non-hollow circles), and many still faced liquidity problems in 2007 
(hollow circles), but there is no pattern among Case 2 countries. As for economic activity, 
Case 1 countries experience overheating; in fact, the circles for countries below potential 
output are almost nonexistent in either 1997 or 2007 (Panel B—the bubbles reflect the size 
20of the output gap). By contrast, such result is present in Case 2 countries only in 2007 (Panel 
C).
29.     For illustrative purposes, the complexities of these additional layers of economic 
factors can be examined for Case 2 (large capital inflows in search of high yield). Ceteris 
paribus, the authorities might follow the policies suggested above (i.e., limited exchange rate 
appreciation, no sterilization, some fiscal tightening, no tightening of monetary policy). Now 
suppose this country is overheating, facing inflationary pressures, has a high short-term debt-
to-GDP ratio, a large exposure in foreign currency denominated debt, and a weak financial 
sector. How do the policy options change for such a country? In this case, the country may 
need to consider monetary tightening to brake the overheating cycle. However, if this leads 
to a higher interest rate and further capital inflows, then sterilization might be required to 
limit inflationary pressures. In addition, the country might have to consider measures that 
would alter the composition and duration of capital inflows so that the balance sheet 
vulnerabilities are not exacerbated. Moreover, if the weak financial sector is unable to 
successfully intermediate all the inflows, the country would need regulations to monitor what 
conduits are being used for the capital to flow through, what risks they pose, and how to 
enforce rules that will address these concerns. In sum, as an increasing number of economic 
factors are added, the policy decision becomes more complex; Section IV attempts to control 
for these factors.
21Figure 6. The Role of Balance Sheets and Cyclical Positions
Panel A. Balance Sheet Characteristics—Case 1 and Case 2 (1997 and 2007)
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Panel B. Cyclical Position for Case 1 (1997 and 2007)
BRA JAM
LKA
KOR
MYS
PAK
CZE
CRI
DOM
SLV
LBN
LKA
EST
SVN
ROM
1997
2007
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
T
o
t
a
l
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
F
l
o
w
s
 
(
I
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
)
-20 -15 -10 -5 0
Current Account Balance (In percent of GDP)
Case 1 --- Above Y Potential
Note: Bubble size based on level of output ABOVE potential.   
BRA JAM
LKA
KOR
MYS
PAK
CZE
CRI
DOM
SLV
LBN
LKA
EST
SVN
ROM
1997
2007
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
T
o
t
a
l
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
F
l
o
w
s
 
(
I
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
)
-20 -15 -10 -5 0
Current Account Balance (In percent of GDP)
Case 1 --- Below Y Potential
Note: Bubble size based on level of output BELOW potential.  
Panel C. Cyclical Position for Case 2 (1997 and 2007)
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22IV.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A.   On Policy Responses
30.     To what extent do countries respond to capital flows and positive balance of payments 
pressures as the taxonomy would suggest? This section explores this question. The exercise 
is positive rather than normative: even if the empirical work finds that countries do not 
behave as the taxonomy would suggest, this does not imply that they should not. Conversely, 
even if it is found that countries do behave as the taxonomy suggests they should, it would 
not necessarily follow that the taxonomy is correct—though it would suggest that the 
taxonomy’s policy implications have found resonance with national authorities. 
31.     In applying the taxonomy to derive policy recommendations for individual countries, 
it would be important to take into account specific circumstances in determining which case 
(or cases) best describes a country’s own situation. This is precisely the empirical challenge 
pursued here by controlling for country-specific factors. Indeed, notwithstanding the existing 
data limitations, it is worth examining the policy response observed in each of the cases 
(Case 1 through Case 3) after controlling for balance sheet vulnerabilities (both solvency and 
liquidity), a country’s cyclical position, and key institutional characteristics (e.g., a country’s 
exchange rate regime).
12 As noted above, policies should not be considered in isolation, but 
as a package aimed at stemming BOP pressures. The regressions should be viewed as a 
convenient way of summarizing policy responses across the various cases rather than as 
formal hypothesis testing, as it is difficult to find valid instruments to control for the 
12 Given the small sample size of Case 4 and Case 5 (see Table 1), these are excluded from the econometric 
estimations. Moreover, Case 1 through Case 3 are the most interesting for the purposes of this paper as they 
represent either cases with positive BOP pressures and/or cases with positive capital flows.
23potential endogeneity of the BOP pressures. It is not clear, however, that such endogeneity 
should bias the results regarding appropriate policy responses across the various cases.
32.     The empirical work uses an unbalanced panel dataset of 50 EMEs using annual data 
over the periods 1990–2007 and 1999–2007. Data subsets are also examined to assess 
whether policy responses have varied with the increased globalization of financial markets. 
Specifically, periods of low or high global liquidity and periods with low and high economic 
activity (country-specific) are considered for the period 1999–2007.
13 The goal is to estimate 
policy reaction functions for each case under the above taxonomy and examine whether 
countries have responded to capital inflows as would be suggested by the taxonomy; while 
results for both periods are reported, the discussion centers only on the period 1999–2007.
33.     The policy reaction functions have as dependent variables various policy instruments; 
fiscal policy measures, monetary policy and sterilization variables, and measures of both 
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate flexibility. The key explanatory variable is the 
BOP pressure (as measured by the sum of net capital flows and the current account balance 
or, in the case of the sterilization regression, by the change in central bank NFA) interacted 
with a dummy for the case to which each observation belongs. What is of interest is the 
differential response “per unit” of balance of payments pressure across the different cases. 
Other variables in the regressions are lagged values of the other policy variables, and 
controls for the country’s cyclical position—its debt-to-GDP ratio, its short-term debt-to-
reserves ratio, inflation, and exchange rate regime; time dummies are also included. The 
estimation is carried out for the sub-samples described.
13 The activity index is constructed by combining inflation rates and output gaps into one index, where each 
component enters the constructed index with mean 0 and variance 1.
24Table 2. Evidence of Tailored Policy Responses  1/
Period Global liquidity (1999-2007) Economic activity (1999-2007)
1990-2007 1999-2007 Low High Low High
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Nominal exchange rate flexibility; an increase represents an appreciation
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.013 *** -0.003 -0.001 -0.020 ** -0.010 -0.010
dummy for case 2 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.007 * -0.001 0.010 *
dummy for case 3 0.006 * 0.006 0.005 0.012 *** 0.004 0.021 **
R-square 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.47 0.10 0.73
Number of observations 491 305 160 145 217 88
Nominal exchange rate volatility; an increase represents greater volatility
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.022 *** -0.003 0.003 -0.014 ** -0.010 0.002
dummy for case 2 0.002 0.006 * 0.000 0.008 *** 0.005 0.005
dummy for case 3 0.012 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 0.009 *** 0.013 *** 0.019 ***
R-square 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.56 0.18 0.84
Number of observations 491 305 160 145 217 88
Monetary policy; an increase represents tightening
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.514 ** 0.551 * 0.288 0.416 0.647 * 1.093 **
dummy for case 2 -0.200 -0.508 *** -0.384 -0.668 *** -0.511 *** -1.150 *
dummy for case 3 0.058 -0.602 ** -0.506 -0.527 -0.280 -0.510
R-square 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.65
Number of observations 626 379 205 174 281 98
Sterilization; -1 implies full sterilization and 0 implies no sterilization
NFA interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.248 *** -0.215 * -0.133 -0.379 ** 0.128 0.306 ***
dummy for case 2 -0.003 -0.190 *** -0.257 * -0.170 * -0.157 0.289
dummy for case 3 -0.126 -0.339 *** -0.501 *** -0.381 * -0.279 ** 0.402 *
R-square 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.75
Number of observations 593 344 172 172 273 71
Fiscal policy; an increase represents tightening
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.125 ** 0.398 ** 0.523 * 0.375 ** 0.418 0.536 ***
dummy for case 2 0.022 -0.037 -0.054 -0.029 -0.095 * 0.105
dummy for case 3 0.188 * 0.043 0.072 0.064 0.049 -0.024
R-square 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.49
Number of observations 626 379 205 174 281 98
Source: Staff estimates.
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
1/ Fixed effects estimation. Includes controls (lagged) for 'other' economic policies (fiscal and monetary policy, exchange
rate flexibility, and sterilization). Estimation also includes controls for initial conditions; specifically, output gap, liquidity
(short-term debt-to-reserves), solvency (debt-to-GDP) ratios, and exchange rate regime. Includes also time dummies.
Nominal Exchange Rate 
34.     As discussed above, faced by balance of payments pressures, a first decision is 
whether to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate. Countries in Case 1 should be 
25least willing to allow such an appreciation (as this could exacerbate their current account 
deficit, which is driving the capital inflows), while countries in Case 3 would be best able to 
allow an appreciation (as their BOP pressures stem from their current account surplus). 
35.     The coefficients for nominal exchange rate flexibility and volatility have the expected 
signs in most regressions, though not all the point estimates are statistically significant. As 
expected, Case 1 countries do not register much nominal exchange rate volatility in an effort 
to resist the appreciation pressures from capital inflows since this could worsen the current 
account balance; in fact, the nominal effective exchange rate appears to record some 
depreciation.
14 By contrast, the evidence on the nominal exchange rate suggests some modest 
appreciation takes place among Case 2 countries, but the magnitude varies across sub-
samples perhaps because this case includes both countries with and without external 
imbalances. Similarly, Case 2 countries also record an increase in exchange rate volatility. 
Finally, Case 3 countries appear to experience both the largest appreciation pressures and the 
largest increases in volatility, and the point estimates are statistically significant. These 
results are consistent with the taxonomy during periods of high global liquidity or high 
economic activity.
Monetary Policy and Sterilization
36.     Turning to monetary policy, the taxonomy would suggested the sharpest tightening for 
Case 1 countries to help narrow the current account deficit. For Case 2 countries, monetary 
tightening risks raising interest rates and attracting further inflows. Tightening would also 
not be appropriate for Case 3 countries inasmuch as it leads to larger current account 
14 The exchange rate volatility indicator is defined as the absolute value of the monthly percentage change of 
the nominal exchange rate over the previous 12 months and averaged over a 12-month horizon (Ghosh and 
others, 2002). The flexibility indicator reflects the change in the exchange rate but without the absolute value.
26surpluses. Empirically, at least in the post-East Asian crisis period, this is borne out—with 
evidence of tightening in Case 1 and loosening in Case 2 and 3 (regression [2]).
15 
Furthermore, the point estimates for monetary policy seem to be larger in the expected 
direction during high global liquidity episodes (regression [4]) and high economic activity 
periods (regression [6]).
37.     A similar logic dictates the use of sterilization: in Case 2, where inflows are assumed 
to be responding to the search for yield, tight monetary policy or sterilization of inflows are 
likely to perpetuate high interest rates and exacerbate the inflows problem. The evidence is 
mixed. A coefficient of -1 would imply full sterilization and 0 would imply no sterilization.
16 
Indeed, the results indicate that an increase in NFA leads to a decline in net domestic assets 
but by less than -1, suggesting partial sterilization. Many of the point estimates are not 
statistically significant, however. While partial sterilization is the norm, the least sterilization 
appears to occur among Case 2 countries, a result that is broadly in line with the proposed 
taxonomy. 
Fiscal Policy
38.     By the logic of the taxonomy, Case 1 countries should undertake the most fiscal 
tightening to reduce the current account deficit. Case 2 countries should also tighten fiscal 
policy—albeit less-to help stem capital inflows responding to high interest rates. Case 3 
countries should not tighten fiscal policy, as this will increase their current account surpluses. 
15 Monetary policy is measured by the change in economic growth and inflation relative to the change in 
broad money—an increase represent a tightening of monetary conditions.
16 Sterilization is represented by the effect of the change in net foreign assets (scaled by the level of reserve 
money) on the change in net domestic assets (also scaled by the level of reserve money).
2739.     The taxonomy’s implications are somewhat borne out in the post-Asian crisis period 
(Table 2).
17 Specifically, fiscal policy was tightened in Case 1 countries (regression [2]; the 
result is statistically significant). The tightening among Case 1 countries is also significant 
and larger in magnitude during periods of high economic activity (regression [6]). By 
contrast, the point estimates in Case 2 and Case 3 are not statistically significant (regression 
[2]) and the point estimates do not always have the expected sign—the taxonomy calls for 
fiscal tightening in Case 2 and loosening in Case 3.
40.     In conclusion, the results seem to indicate that EMEs do not resort overwhelmingly to 
any one policy response to capital flows. Indeed, all four policy responses discussed earlier 
have, to varying degrees, a role to play in dealing with capital flows. More importantly, 
however, the reaction functions are broadly consistent with the priors described by the 
conceptual taxonomy. Although the results are not always statistically significant and vary 
across sub-samples, they suggest that the policy emphasis seems to vary from case-to-case. 
Furthermore, for each case, countries’ policy responses appear to vary over time—in 
particular, the results seem quite different between the pre- and post-East Asian crisis. 
B.   On Macroeconomic Outcomes
41.     As discussed before, economic policies should not be considered in isolation but rather 
as a package of measures to help stem BOP pressures. A key “summary statistic” of the 
overall effect of policies is, in this regard, the real exchange rate.
18 What conclusions can be 
17 Fiscal policy is represented by the fiscal impulse; that is, the change in the difference between the regular 
and the cyclically-adjusted general government balance—an increase represents a tightening of fiscal 
conditions. 
18 The exchange rate volatility indicator is defined as the absolute value of the monthly percentage change of 
the real exchange rate over the previous 12 months and averaged over a 12-month horizon. The flexibility 
indicator also reflects the change in the real exchange rate but without the absolute value.
28derived? In Case 1 countries, the goal is to limit the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and reduce exchange rate volatility; indeed a different result would likely worsen the current 
account deficit and the need for capital inflows. By contrast, in Case 3 (where the current 
account surpluses play a more crucial role), a real exchange rate appreciation would reduce 
the current account surplus and therefore help relieve BOP pressures; thus, policymakers 
should be less concerned with allowing an increase in exchange rate volatility. In between 
these two extremes is Case 2. But for these countries, the implications are more ambiguous. 
If there is a current account surplus, the appreciation could help relieve the BOP pressures—
unless it portends further (nominal and real) appreciation, which could attract more inflows. 
However, this case also includes countries with current account deficits, where limiting 
appreciation might be advisable. 
42.     Empirically, this pattern is largely borne out. Case 1 countries record a decline in real 
exchange rate volatility in response to positive BOP pressures, both in the full as well as 
what will be referred to as the reduced sample (regressions [2] and [3] in the upper and lower 
panels of Table 3).
19 Case 2 countries experience an increase in volatility in all of the 
estimated equations, but this is statistically significant only in some cases (e.g., regression 
[2] and [4] of the full sample). Some of the regressions in both the full and reduced samples 
also show that Case 2 countries experience appreciation pressures. Finally, results for Case 3 
are the most consistent with the taxonomy. Indeed, these countries have a statistically 
significant increase in exchange rate volatility across most sub-samples. This increase is 
particularly important during periods of increased global liquidity or high economic activity. 
19 The reduced sample is intended to focus the empirical work on the “most extreme” observations for each 
case. To this end, one-third of the observations that are farther away from any neighboring cases are picked. 
In effect, as noted in Figure 5, the reduced sample drops observations that are at either side of the diagonals or 
close to the origin because these observations could be construed as representing “combined” cases.
29Also, Case 3 countries experience appreciation pressures and this result holds across sub-
samples and for both the full sample and the reduced sample; again, the results are 
particularly strong during periods of increased global liquidity or during periods in which 
economic activity picks up.
V.   CONCLUSIONS
43.     Until 2007, the resurgence of capital flows to emerging market countries and the 
emergence of current account surpluses resulted in significant balance of payments pressures. 
Depending upon such factors as the evolution of the country’s net foreign asset position, the 
central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves, the form of the capital flows and the 
structure of domestic balance sheets, and the cyclical position of the economy, these positive 
pressures need not pose a problem—and indeed may be welcome for enhancing growth 
prospects. To the extent that they do, however, some policy response is required. 
30Table 3. Macroeconomic Outcomes  1/
Period Global liquidity (1999-2007) Economic activity (1999-2007)
1990-2007 1998-2007 Low High Low High
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
FULL SAMPLE
Real exchange rate flexibility; an increase represents an appreciation
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.023 *** -0.006 0.002 -0.021 ** -0.010 -0.005
dummy for case 2 0.005 * 0.004 0.004 0.008 ** 0.001 0.005
dummy for case 3 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.013 0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.019 **
R-square 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.46 0.29 0.75
Number of observations 491 305 160 145 217 88
Real exchange rate volatility; an increase represents greater volatility
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.028 *** -0.006 0.006 -0.017 ** -0.011 0.003
dummy for case 2 0.003 0.008 * 0.000 0.009 *** 0.005 0.002
dummy for case 3 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.017 0.011 *** 0.018 *** 0.019 **
R-square 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.55 0.31 0.82
Number of observations 491 305 160 145 217 88
REDUCED SAMPLE  2/
Real exchange rate flexibility; an increase represents an appreciation
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.022 *** -0.016 ** -0.015 *** -0.016 * -0.013 -0.003
dummy for case 2 0.006 ** 0.007 ** 0.008 * 0.000 0.003 -0.003
dummy for case 3 0.015 *** 0.020 *** -0.001 0.012 ** 0.017 * 0.027 ***
R-square 0.63 0.54 0.85 0.85 0.43 0.97
Number of observations 170 107 47 60 65 42
Real exchange rate volatility; an increase represents greater volatility
Net flows interacted with:
dummy for case 1 -0.027 *** -0.008 -0.011 ** -0.011 * -0.012 * 0.006
dummy for case 2 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.007
dummy for case 3 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 0.012 0.007 * 0.003 0.026 ***
R-square 0.62 0.46 0.81 0.75 0.51 0.97
Number of observations 170 107 47 60 65 42
Source: Staff estimates.
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respecrively.
1/ Fixed effects estimation.
2/ One-third of the “most extreme” observations in each case; that is, the farther away from neighboring cases. Actual
number of observations might be slightly smaller than one-third owing to data used in the econometric estimation.
44.     This paper develops a simple conceptual taxonomy to identify the circumstances under 
which various policy responses might be appropriate. In large measure, the implications of 
the taxonomy are a matter of degree: as such, the framework can help inform judgments 
about the correct policy response, but cannot of course replace the need for such judgment. 
While the taxonomy is largely founded on flow factors (current account and total capital 
31flows), the empirical work attempts to control for a number of other factors, including 
balance sheet vulnerabilities and cyclical positions, the role of institutional factors and the 
importance of sample periods chosen (and sub-samples within the post-Asian crisis period).
45.     In general, there is some correspondence between the policy implications of the 
analytical taxonomy and observed policy choices of EMEs since the East Asian crisis. But 
while the pattern is broadly consistent, this does not necessarily imply that actual policies 
have responded appropriately to the BOP pressures. As the taxonomy would predict, Case 1 
countries have—to a greater degree than the other cases—tightened fiscal policy in response 
to BOP pressures, but this does not mean that the fiscal stance is necessarily correct: in 
“level” terms, it may be too tight or too loose. Similarly, Case 2 and Case 3 have experienced 
in the post-Asian crisis period significant monetary policy loosening, in line with the policy 
responses suggested by the taxonomy. This is also the case for sterilization, which is large 
(and statistically significant) in Case 1 and Case 3, but less strong among Case 2 countries. 
The results in terms of nominal exchange rate flexibility and exchange rate volatility are 
quite convincing across most cases; reduced volatility and some depreciation pressures 
among Case 1 countries and increased appreciation pressures and volatility among Case 3 
countries—less clear is the evidence for Case 2 countries. As to the results regarding the real 
exchange rate, which can be interpreted as a summary statistic of all economic policies, these 
are broadly in line with the taxonomy—increased depreciation pressures and reduced 
volatility in Case 1 and increased appreciation pressures and increased volatility in Case 3, 
with Case 2 countries experiencing a weaker version of Case 3.
3246.     In applying this framework to draw policy prescriptions, therefore, four challenges 
remain. First, is to determine the right “level” at which to pitch policies, not just the pattern 
across cases. Second, ts to anticipate where the country will be in terms of the taxonomy 
over the relevant planning horizon. Indeed, it would be interesting to examine what we can 
learn from the transition experienced by countries over consecutive years. The third 
challenge relates to taking account of the country-specific factors that are not captured by the 
general taxonomy and have not yet been included among the controls in the empirical work 
(e.g., financial soundness indicators). Fourth, while the taxonomy has discussed the possible 
role of capital controls, this remains an area for research; in particular, their possible decline 
in effectiveness in the period that has followed the post-East Asian crisis—the period of 
rapid financial innovation and globalization—needs to be examined. In conclusion, though 
capital flows pose formidable challenges and the appropriateness of policy responses is tied 
to country-specific factors, the conceptual framework developed here provides useful 
guidance on how best to deal with capital inflows and other BOP pressures.
3347.     Appendix I. Market Access Developing Countries in Sample
Country name Country code Country name Country code
Argentina ARG Korea KOR
Azerbaijan, Rep. of AZE Latvia               LVA
Brazil BRA Lebanon              LBN
Bulgaria             BGR Lithuania            LTU
Chile CHL Malaysia             MYS
China, P. R. CHN Mexico MEX
Colombia COL Morocco              MAR
Costa Rica           CRI Pakistan PAK
Croatia HRV Peru PER
Czech Republic CZE Philippines PHL
Dominican Republic DOM Poland               POL
Ecuador ECU Romania ROM
Egypt EGY Russia RUS
El Salvador          SLV Slovak Republic      SVK
Estonia              EST Slovenia SVN
Guatemala            GTM South Africa         ZAF
Hong Kong HKG Sri Lanka LKA
Hungary              HUN Thailand THA
India IND Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Indonesia            IDN Tunisia TUN
Iran, I. R. of IRN Turkey TUR
Israel               ISR Ukraine UKR
Jamaica              JAM Uruguay URY
Jordan JOR Venezuela, Rep. Bol. VEN
Kazakhstan           KAZ Vietnam VNM
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